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I. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Michel Bastarache had a strong sense of justice, but he also valued 
principle and was committed to principled decision-making. His 
Supreme Court of Canada opinions were closely analyzed, rigorously 
argued and powerfully written. And, as one who was proud of the Court, 
he was not hesitant to defend the institution from accusations of judicial 
activism. Hence he wrote that sometimes criticism was “simply based on 
a misunderstanding of the facts”, and that often it was “just an attack on 
outcomes disguised as an attack on judicial activism”.
1
 Justice 
Bastarache regarded attacks on the Court‟s activism as a cover for 
disapproval of certain outcomes, and responded that judicial accountability 
was the answer to concerns about the Court‟s work. As he explained, 
accountability “takes the form of reasons for judgments and demonstrating 
that the protection against arbitrariness is in the process of decision-
making and the reality of judicial precedent”.
2
 He proposed, in other 
words, that principled decision-making is a check — perhaps the best or 




In 2008, the year of Michel Bastarache‟s retirement from the Court, 
Osgoode Hall Law School‟s 12th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 
                                                                                                             
*  Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I owe thanks to Stephanie 
Anderson, J.D. 2011, for providing research assistance in the preparation of this paper. 
1  Michel Bastarache, “Decision-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 56 
U.N.B.L.J. 328, at 329. 
2  Id. 
3  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
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explored some of his contributions to the Charter jurisprudence.
4
 Though 
he was known and admired, throughout his professional life, as a 
champion of minority language rights, Justice Bastarache was not one to 
favour some issues and to ignore others. Instead, he contributed at all 
levels of Charter interpretation, and over a period of 10 years on the 
Court, from September 30, 1997 to June 30, 2008, he participated actively 
across the spectrum of entitlements. As his fundamental freedoms 
jurisprudence demonstrates, his Supreme Court legacy is rich and complex. 
Justice Bastarache wrote at least nine significant opinions on section 
2 issues, six of which counted as majority opinions.
5
 It is a surprising 
record, considering that more than once he wrote to backtrack from — 
and all but overrule — earlier decisions of his own. Initially, he decided 
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada in favour of expressive freedom and 
proposed a new and improved approach to section 2(b) decision-
making.
6
 Thomson Newspapers was followed, a few years later, by 
Harper v. Canada and R. v. Bryan, both of which went in the opposite 
direction.
7
 Not only did the section 2(b) claim fail in these cases, 
Bastarache J.‟s two majority opinions effectively abandoned the 
Thomson Newspapers methodology. Meanwhile, his first opinions under 
section 2(d) dismissed the associational freedom claims in no uncertain 
terms,
8
 but within a space of two years led to his groundbreaking 
decision in Dunmore v. Ontario.
9
 Here, as under section 2(b), his earlier 
and later decisions are difficult to reconcile. Even so, Bastarache J. spoke 
                                                                                                             
4  See also James Hendry, “The Contribution of Justice Bastarache to Equality Law” (2009) 
47 S.C.L.R. (3d) 341; and Michel Y. Hélie, “Michel Bastarache‟s Language Rights Legacy” (2009) 
47 S.C.L.R. (3d) 377. 
5  Under s. 2(a), see Syndicat Northcrest v. Anselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 
551 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Syndicat Northcrest”] (dissenting opinion); under s. 2(b), see Thomson 
Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”]; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper”]; R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 
S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.); and Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.) 
(dissenting in part); and under s. 2(d), see Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 
S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Egg”] (joint majority opinion 
with Iacobucci J.); Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 
S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delisle v. Canada”]; R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring, [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Advance Cutting”]; and Dunmore v. 
Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Dunmore”]. Syndicat Northcrest, Re Vancouver Sun, and Advance Cutting were dissenting 
opinions. 
6  Thomson Newspapers, id. 
7  Harper and R. v. Bryan, supra, note 5. 
8  See Canadian Egg and Delisle v. Canada, supra, note 5. 
9  Supra, note 5. 
(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 325 
for the majority in each of these cases: when he shifted, the Court — 
albeit with some dissenters — tended to follow. As a result, he had a 
strong but uneven influence on the Charter‟s fundamental freedoms: a 
rights-dampening impact on section 2(b) that is paired with a rights-
enhancing effect on section 2(d). 
This article considers how this jurisprudence stands up to Justice 
Bastarache‟s concept of judicial accountability. In sections which address 
his key majority opinions on expressive and associational freedom, the 
discussion examines the relationship between principles and outcomes in 
his decision-making.
10
 The analysis reveals, once his reasons for judgment 
and treatment of precedent are explored, that Justice Bastarache changed 
his mind and, in doing so, promoted outcomes at the expense of 
principled decision-making. Yet his commitment to principle — and to 
the judicial accountability he advocated — caused him to ground his 
conclusions in elaborate reasoning. The difficulty is that his reasoning 
was convoluted and unpersuasive. To be blunt, he was a kind of 
“precedent bully”: though the term is unflattering, it describes what 
Justice Bastarache had to do to keep precedent on his side when it stood 
in the way of certain outcomes. The article concludes that he took 
judicial accountability seriously but was unable to reconcile its 
requirements with the demands of decision-making — as he perceived 
them — under the Charter‟s fundamental freedoms guarantees. 
II. SECTION 2(b): ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO BACK 
The judges from Quebec who voted en bloc in Thomson Newspapers 
v. Canada might have been surprised to find themselves relegated to 
dissent.
11
 From their perspective, the Court‟s judgment in Libman v. 
Quebec (Attorney General)
12
 supported their conclusion, which would 
have upheld Parliament‟s blackout on opinion polls in the final 72 hours 
of a federal election campaign.
13
 Despite invalidating the province‟s de 
facto ban on third party spending, Libman found that the regulation of 
referendum spending advances one of expressive freedom‟s objectives, 
                                                                                                             
10  The paper does not discuss his opinions in Syndicat Northcrest, Re Vancouver Sun, or 
Advance Cutting, supra, note 5. 
11  Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 5. Justice Gonthier wrote a dissenting opinion which 
was signed by Lamer C.J.C. and L‟Heureux-Dubé J., the other two judges from Quebec. 
12  [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Libman”]. 
13  Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2 (now S.C. 2000, c. 9). 
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“namely the [voter‟s] ability to make informed choices”.
14
 In Thomson 
Newspapers, Gonthier J. found that the distorting effects of potentially 
inaccurate polls would undermine “the informed exercise of the right to 
vote” and a fundamental purpose of expressive freedom, which is to 
promote “informed participation in the electoral process”.
15
 He stated 
that there was no suggestion, in the blackout provision, that members of 
Parliament had “any interest other than to foster the integrity of the 
electoral process”,
16
 and he held, in the circumstances, that the Charter 
should not defeat “a reasonable attempt by Parliament to allay potential 
distortion of voter choice”.
17
 The dissenting judges thought that deference 
was appropriate, because “[b]eing themselves the very objects of 
elections, members of Parliament were in the best position to assess the 




Justice Gonthier‟s discussion of Libman and the informed voter was 
persuasive, but not persuasive enough. Michel Bastarache, who wrote the 
majority opinion in Thomson Newspapers, had joined the Court on 
September 30, 1997, just one week before Libman was decided. 
Thomson was one of his first panels, and it was argued, coincidentally, 
the day Libman was released.
19
 Not only did Bastarache J.‟s majority 
opinion reverse the Ontario Court of Appeal, in doing so it chose not to 
apply or expand Libman‟s informed voter rationale. In striking down 
section 322.1 of the Canada Elections Act, Bastarache J. noted, more 
than once, that Parliament‟s opinion poll blackout constituted a serious 
interference with expressive activity “at the core of s. 2(b)”.
20
 
Significantly, he introduced a methodology that retreated from the 
contextual approach of the 1990s, emphasized section 1‟s requirement of 
harm, set an unflinching evidentiary standard of justification, and 
provided a serious analysis of the salutary benefits-deleterious 
consequences issue. It was a tour de force for a newcomer which seemed, 
by its methodology as well as by the outcome, to set section 2(b)‟s 
prospects on a different, and more auspicious, plane. 
                                                                                                             
14  Libman, supra, note 12, at 603-604 (citing Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 
S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.)). Quebec‟s third party referendum spending limit of 
$600 was so low that it effectively operated as a ban on participation. 
15  Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 5, at 908. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
19  The date was October 9, 1997. 
20  Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 5, at 945. 
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Three features of the Bastarache opinion worked in combination to 
create a strong methodology for section 2(b) adjudication. First was his 
recognition of the activity‟s value, and the consequences of Parliament‟s 
ban, which interfered with “the flow of information pertaining to the 
most important democratic duty which most Canadians will undertake in 
their lives: their choice as to who will govern them”.
21
 Second was his 
unwillingness to justify the limit in the absence of “more specific and 
conclusive” evidence that the prospect of inaccurate or misleading polls 
affected a large number of voters, or that “such possible distortions” in 
hypothetically flawed polls are significant to the “conduct” of an 
election.
22
 In adopting that approach, Bastarache J. neatly distinguished a 
series of Supreme Court precedents — decided under the then-prevailing 
version of the contextual approach — which had minimized the 
requirement of harm in section 2(b) cases. Finally, given the conclusion 
that “the claims of widespread or significant harm … are not 
compelling”,
23
 he declared his unwillingness to accept that Thomson 
Newspapers “warrants a significant level of deference to the government 
in fashioning means which trespass on the freedom of expression”.
24
 At 
this moment in time, Bastarache J. was firmly of the view that “little 
deference should be shown … where … the government has not 




Justice Bastarache‟s majority opinion in Thomson Newspapers 
looked much like a breakthrough decision for section 2(b). Outside the 
open justice jurisprudence, the Court consistently upheld limits on 
expressive freedom during the 1990s, under a section 1 methodology 
styled “the contextual approach”, which had the advantage — from the 
Court‟s perspective — of predetermining the outcome against expressive 
freedom.
26
 Against that backdrop, it is no exaggeration to suggest that, 
apart from Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,
27
 Thomson 
                                                                                                             
21  Id., at 971. 
22  Id., at 962. 
23  Id., at 957. 
24  Id., at 962. 
25  Id., at 963. 
26  For an analysis and critique of this approach, see J. Cameron, “The Past, Present and 
Future of Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. 
27  [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). 
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Newspapers was the Court‟s most important section 2(b) decision since 
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General).
28
 
At least to some, Harper v. Canada was something of a shock, not 
least because Bastarache J.‟s majority opinion bore greater resemblance 
to Gonthier J.‟s dissent in Thomson Newspapers than to his own majority 
opinion in that case.
29
 Harper returned the Court to Libman‟s third party 
spending issue, in the altered context of federal legislation and federal 
election campaigns. The question there was whether Parliament‟s spending 
limit of $3,000 per individual was still too low, or was generous enough 
under Libman to pass constitutional muster.
30
 For a variety of reasons, 
including but not limited to the number itself, it was unclear how the 
Court would respond. In the interim since Libman, the judges had upheld 





 — though both engaged section 2(b) at the level of “low 
value” expression. On questions relating to the political process, the 
Court had decided in favour of expressive freedom three times in a row 
— in Libman, Thomson Newspapers, and Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney 
General),
33
 and the Alberta courts had invalidated Parliament‟s new 
spending limit.
34
 Even so, Libman was an enigma, an anonymous and 
unanimous opinion which forged a careful compromise between those 
judges who thought that the limits on referendum participation were 
deservedly unjustifiable, and others who favoured an egalitarian 
approach which placed equality-based limits on rights of democratic 
participation.
35
 The composition of the Court had also changed, and it 
                                                                                                             
28  [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.) (invalidating Quebec‟s sign language 
law). Other decisions, such as RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 17, 
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.), invalidating Parliament‟s ban on tobacco advertising, and R. v. Zundel, 
[1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.), invalidating the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. 
C-46, false news offence, are also important. What sets Thomson Newspapers apart from those is 
Bastarache J.‟s methodology and approach to the harm requirement. 
29  Harper, supra, note 5. 
30  Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 350(1). 
31  Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada, [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 
1120 (S.C.C.) (concluding that customs officers violated the rights of a gay bookstore, but declining 
to invalidate the legislation). 
32  [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.) (upholding the Criminal Code‟s child 
pornography provisions, though at the same time reading two exceptions into the legislation). 
33  [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Figueroa”]. 
34  Harper v. Canada, [2002] A.J. No. 1542, 223 D.L.R. (4th) 275 (Alta. C.A.). 
35  In that regard it is noteworthy that the Court‟s opinion in Libman gratuitously disagreed 
with the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] A.J. 
No. 515, 136 D.L.R. (4th) 205 (Alta. C.A.), which had invalidated earlier federal spending limits, 
but not been appealed. See Libman, supra, note 12, at 604, 619 (stating baldly, that “we cannot 
accept the Alberta Court of Appeal‟s point of view”). 
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was significant that the Court had earlier stayed the injunction in 
Harper.
36
 That decision allowed limits on campaign spending which 
were declared unconstitutional to be enforced during an election 
campaign. In hindsight it seems the Court may have tipped its hand in 
leaving the provision in place and denying a constitutional remedy for 
the ongoing violation of a core constitutional right. 
In these circumstances, Harper v. Canada marked a turning point for 
section 2(b). Given a choice between Libman‟s invitation to regulate 
third party spending, and the rights-protective Thomson Newspapers 
methodology, Bastarache J. returned to Libman and upheld Parliament‟s 
strict limits on third party spending in federal election campaigns. As a 
result of this choice, expressive activity which was at the core of section 
2(b) in Thomson Newspapers did not compel a strict standard of 
justification in Harper, and Parliament‟s limit was upheld though section 
1‟s requirement of harm was not met. More to the point, Bastarache J.‟s 
majority opinion retreated from each of the key elements of his 
methodology in Thomson Newspapers. Whereas the opinion poll case put 
the expressive activity on show — and was proud to defend its Charter 
status — Harper minimized the value of third party participation in 
election campaigns. For instance, Justice Bastarache had little choice but 
to concede that democratic participation is at the core of section 2(b), but 
added that in some circumstances — which were not specified — “third 
party advertising will be less deserving of constitutional protection”.
37
 
He also refused to apply Figueroa‟s principle of meaningful participation 
to campaign spending.
38
 In place of Thomson Newspapers and its 
methodology, Bastarache J. revived Libman‟s “informed voter” and 
interpreted Figueroa‟s concept of meaningful participation to produce a 
conclusion that “equality in the political discourse is necessary”.
39
 Under 
this view, voters are informed when their access to information is 
controlled for equality, and participate meaningfully when information is 
                                                                                                             
36  Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] S.C.J. No. 58, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 764 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper I”] (Major J., dissenting). 
37  Harper v. Canada, supra, note 5, at para. 85. 
38  Figueroa, supra, note 33. There, and in the context of s. 3 of the Charter, Iacobucci J. 
made a series of uninhibited and untethered pronouncements about the scope and importance of 
participation in the electoral process. For instance, he spoke of the right “to a certain level of 
participation” (at 934); stated that each citizen “must have a genuine opportunity to take part in the 
governance of the country through participation in the selection of elected representatives” (at 936); 
and declared that participation has “an intrinsic value independent of its impact on the actual 
outcome of elections” (at 935). His colleague Michel Bastarache concurred in that opinion. 
39  Harper v. Canada, supra, note 5, at para. 72. 
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curbed, rather than made freely available, to ensure the egalitarian 
presentation of ideas. 
Moreover, while Thomson Newspapers insisted on evidence of harm, 
and refused to uphold the opinion poll blackout in its absence, Harper 
effectively dispensed with the requirement. In answer to evidence that 
third-party advertising has had no impact on elections, Bastarache J. 
retorted that the findings “do not allow us, however, to conclude that 
third-party advertising will never have an impact in Canadian 
elections”.
40
 In addition, he alarmingly declared that “[s]urely Parliament 
does not have to wait for the feared harm to occur before it can enact 
measures to prevent the possibility of harm occurring or to remedy the 
harm, should it occur.”
41
 In effect, this constituted an invitation to 
Parliament to pre-empt expressive activity — which is not only 
guaranteed by the Charter but is found at its core — in case it might at 
some hypothetical date cause previously unknown harm. 
Finally, after taking care in Thomson Newspapers to dissociate 
himself from the concept, Bastarache J. openly embraced deference in 
Harper. Thus he criticized the lower courts for failing to “give any 
deference to Parliament‟s choice of electoral model”, stated that “[g]iven 
the right of Parliament to choose Canada‟s electoral model and the 
nuances inherent in implementing this model, the Court must approach 
the justification analysis with deference,” and concluded that “[o]n 
balance, the contextual factors favour a deferential approach to Parliament 
in determining whether the third party advertising expense limits are 
demonstrably justified.”
42
 His position on deference in Harper enabled 
him to overcome the evidentiary deficit that would have been fatal under 
the Thomson Newspapers methodology. In addition, it allowed him to 
disguise his support for an egalitarian concept of democratic 
participation, which reduced expressive activity at section 2(b)‟s core to 
“an equal right not to participate”.
43
 It is extraordinary, in that regard, 
that his majority opinion referenced equality or an egalitarian conception 
of participation more than 25 times. Justice Bastarache deferred to 
Parliament, not because the government demonstrated that third party 
spending is harmful or met the requisite standard of justification, but 
because he — and others in the majority — agreed with the limit and 
                                                                                                             
40  Id., at para. 98. 
41  Id. 
42  Id., at paras. 64, 87, and 88. 
43  See J. Cameron, “Governance and Anarchy in the Section 2(b) Jurisprudence: A 
Comment on Re Vancouver Sun and Harper v. Canada” (2004) 17 N.J.C.L. 71, at 94-100. 
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Justice Bastarache‟s next, and last, decision on election law 
confirmed that Harper was not isolated, and that he had changed his 
mind since Thomson Newspapers. The issue in R. v. Bryan was whether 
section 329 of the Canada Elections Act, which prohibited the reporting 
of election results in any part of Canada where polls were still open, was 
unconstitutional.
45
 Here, too, he wrote for a majority which upheld the 
provision. Ironically, the key elements of his erstwhile Thomson 
Newspapers methodology are found in Abella J.‟s dissent. In challenging 
the majority opinion‟s analysis she emphasized the nature of the activity 
— the transmission of election results — and its status as a “core 
democratic right”;
46
 she articulated the requirement for “clear and 
convincing evidence” to justify limits on the availability of the 
information;
47
 and she focused on the absence of evidence to demonstrate 
that “informational inequality” in access to election results harms the 
electoral process in any way.
48
 That approach led her to the conclusion 
that the legislative provision was unconstitutional and could not be 
upheld. 
Justice Bastarache essentially had two responses to Abella J.‟s claim 
that section 329 was an unnecessary remedy for an “undemonstrated 
problem” and an “overbroad intrusion on a Charter right”.
49
 Relying on 
his own opinion in Harper, he stated that it is established principle that 
“courts ought to take a natural attitude of deference toward Parliament 
when dealing with election laws”.
50
 As Harper showed, the advantage of 
deference is that it can cure most deficits of evidence and defects of 
proportionality under the Oakes test. Second, Bastarache J. discounted 
the expressive activity in Bryan, referring to it as “the putative right to 
receive election results before the polls close” and placing it at “the 
                                                                                                             
44  Chief Justice McLachlin and Major J. wrote a dissent, in which Binnie J. concurred. 
45  R. v. Bryan, supra, note 5. 
46  Id., at para. 110. Bryan was a 5-4 vote, with McLachlin C.J.C., as well as Binnie and 
LeBel JJ. concurring in her opinion; Justices Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein joined Bastarache 
J.‟s majority opinion, and Fish J. wrote concurring reasons which supplemented the Bastarache 
opinion. 
47  Id. 
48  As she stated, “[a]ny evidence of harm to the public‟s perception or conduct in knowing 
the election results from Atlantic Canada before they vote is speculative, conclusive and largely 
unsubstantiated” and that “[t]he harm of suppressing core political speech” is profound; id., at para. 
107. 
49  Id., at para. 133. 
50  Id., at para. 9. 
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periphery of the s. 2(b) guarantee”.
51
 He also minimized the effect of the 
ban in order to enhance the importance of “informational equality” as a 
principle of electoral fairness in Canada. At least in Harper he admitted 
that the harm of third party spending was not established by the record. 
After observing that breach of informational equality is in a “class of 
harms” that cannot be measured, Bryan skirted the harm requirement 
altogether. Justice Bastarache‟s majority opinion failed to define what 
informational equality is, or to identify what harm follows from early 
access to results, other than to reference the need for public confidence 
and to cite evidence from one public survey.
52
 
Yet Bastarache J. was once again able to sway a majority to uphold 
the provision, and though Thomson Newspapers took an important step 
forward, Harper and Bryan took significant steps backward. As the 
dissents in both later cases reveal, it would have been difficult — if not 
impossible — to uphold the Harper and Bryan provisions under the 
Thomson Newspapers methodology. From that perspective, it seems 
clear that Bastarache J. changed his mind about the relationship between 
section 2(b) and Parliament‟s authority to regulate the electoral process. 
Yet more troubling than the outcomes in these cases was Bastarache J.‟s 
approach to decision-making and his abandonment of principle, 
specifically, the suggestion in Harper and Bryan that the Court should 
defer to Parliament when it infringes constitutionally protected activity at 
the heart of the democratic process, and the relaxation of review under 




While Bastarache J. substituted a methodology of deference for his 
rights-protective approach to section 2(b) in Thomson Newspapers, his 
interventions in the section 2(d) jurisprudence went in the opposite 
direction. There, he moved from majority opinions which entrenched 
rights-restricting doctrine to a breakthrough which all but stood 
precedent on its head. 
                                                                                                             
51  Id., at para. 30. 
52  See id., at para. 25 (discussing a poll which found that 70 per cent of Canadians surveyed 
thought that voters should not know the results from other provinces before voting in their home 
province). 
53  For comments see C. Bredt & M. Finley, “R. v. Bryan: The Supreme Court and the 
Electoral Process”, in Constitutional Cases 2007 (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 63 [hereinafter “Cases, 
2007”]; and R. Haigh, “The Technology of Political Communication: R. v. Bryan and the 
Knowledgeable Voter in the 21st Century”, Cases, 2007, id., at 91. 
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III. SECTION 2(d): FROM NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE 
Dunmore v. Ontario could be Michel Bastarache‟s most important 
Charter decision.
54
 Despite stopping short of overruling the Court‟s 
foundational section 2(d) precedents, he effectively achieved that result 
by concluding that it was unconstitutional for the province to exclude 
agricultural workers from its labour relations scheme, and imposing a 
positive obligation on Ontario to ensure the meaningful exercise of their 
right of associational freedom. That conclusion placed the Court‟s 
decision in Dunmore openly in conflict with Delisle v. Canada, which 
had reached the opposite conclusion only two years earlier, in a case 
involving RCMP officers.
55
 Justice Bastarache authored both majority 
opinions. 
The drama began when he took the lead in both of the Court‟s pre-
Dunmore opinions, Canadian Egg and Delisle.
56
 It would not be entirely 
accurate to state that Bastarache J. simply followed precedent in these 
cases, because the Court had been unable to agree on a basic doctrine for 
section 2(d) up to that point. In the follow-up from the Labour Trilogy, 
which failed to produce a majority position on associational freedom, 
Sopinka J. proposed a four-point framework in Professional Institute, 
which did not secure majority support either.
57
 For these reasons the 
section 2(d) doctrine was not settled until Bastarache J. arrived and 
participated actively in Canadian Egg and Delisle. In doing so, he 
cemented the status of doctrines which gave section 2(d) a narrow and 
restrictive interpretation — one which had stoutly resisted the 
constitutionalization of labour relations. 
Though it is not generally considered a significant decision, the joint 
opinion by Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ. in Canadian Egg had the 
                                                                                                             
54  Supra, note 5. 
55  Delisle, supra, note 5. 
56  Canadian Egg, supra, note 5, and Delisle, id. Included in his contributions on s. 2(d) 
issues, but not discussed here, is his dissenting opinion in Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, which also 
supported the entitlement in the contentious context of freedom from compelled association with 
labour unions, which Quebec made a statutory condition of employment in the construction industry. 
For a comment which praises his dissent, see J. Cameron, “The „Second Labour Trilogy‟: A 
Comment on R. v. Advance Cutting, Dunmore v. Ontario, and R.W.D.S.U. v. Pepsi-Cola” (2002) 16 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 67, at 71-79 [hereinafter “Cameron, „The “Second Labour Trilogy”  ‟ ”]. 
57  See Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories 
(Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, at 402 (S.C.C.). The Labour Trilogy 
comprises Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Alberta Reference”]; P.S.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. 
No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); and Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. 
Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.). 
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distinction of endorsing the Labour Trilogy‟s distinction between an 
association and its activities and bringing the Professional Institute 
framework into a majority opinion for the first time.
58
 In Delisle, 
Bastarache J. went further and confirmed the status of the section 2(d) 
doctrine, including the Labour Trilogy and the four-point framework 
from Professional Institute, which — he clarified — had been “cited 
with approval” by Canadian Egg.
59
 Neither case provided any indication 
that he, or other members of the Court in the majority, were willing to 
entertain any other conception of associational freedom.
60
 
To the contrary, Bastarache J.‟s opinion in Delisle dismissed the 
claim without reservation. There, the question was whether it was 
impermissible for the federal government to exclude the RCMP from its 
statutory labour relations scheme. The conclusion could scarcely have 
been clearer to him, and Bastarache J. resoundingly rejected the 
suggestion that the legislature‟s decision to exclude the RCMP had any 
consequences for their freedom of association.
61
 In his view, the 
legislation created no obstacle or impediment to associational activity, 
any failure by the RCMP to organize and bargain as an association was 
not caused by or attributed to state action, and the state had no positive 
obligation to facilitate the associational activities of police officers by 
granting them recognition under the statute. He was unreceptive to Cory 
J.‟s claim, in dissent, that the workers in Delisle were vulnerable and in 
need of the Charter‟s protection.
62
 At this time, Bastarache J. shared the 
view expressed by McIntyre J. in the Alberta Reference that “labour 
relations is an area in which a deferential approach is required in order to 
leave Parliament enough flexibility to act”.
63
 
When Dunmore raised the same issue, he discovered how difficult it 
was to reach a different conclusion and follow precedent at the same 
                                                                                                             
58  Canadian Egg, supra, note 5, at 231-32. 
59  Delisle, supra, note 5, at 1106-1107. 
60  There were dissents in both cases: in Canadian Egg, McLachlin J. (as she then was) (with 
Major J. concurring) dissented, and because she would have found a violation of mobility rights she 
did not discuss section 2(d); in Delisle, Cory J. dissented and was joined by Iacobucci J., who had 
co-written the opinion with Bastarache J. in Canadian Egg. 
61  His opinion was particularly forceful on two key points. First, he emphasized that it is 
settled that the government‟s failure to include certain workers in its collective bargaining scheme 
creates no barrier and has no impact on the workers‟ freedom to create and organize an independent 
association. Second, he maintained that s. 2‟s concern is with negative obligations and that the 
guarantee does not constrain the government‟s freedom to choose which employee associations to 
bargain with, or whether to bargain at all: Delisle, id., at 1015-1019. 
62  Id., at 1039. 
63  Id., at 1019. 
(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 335 
time. In this, section 2(d) was unlike section 2(b), where the contextual 
approach allowed the Court to vary its evidentiary standard and 
conception of harm with the circumstances. The wiggle room of the 
Court‟s expressive freedom methodology simply did not exist under 
section 2(d) doctrine, which was rigid and exclusionary. There a claim 
had only succeeded once before, in Libman, where associational freedom 
rode the coattails of the section 2(b) claim.
64
 Not only had the section 
2(d) jurisprudence excluded all labour claims from the Charter, the 
equality case law did not allow the Court to treat Dunmore as a case of 
under-inclusiveness under section 15.
65
 
Yet the circumstances in Dunmore were compelling, and so 
Bastarache J. found a way to claim obedience to precedent while finding 
in favour of the agricultural workers. Rather than admit that Delisle was 
wrongly decided, he went to great lengths to explain how a different and 
contrary result in Dunmore could be reconciled with existing authority. 
To do so he manufactured an argument to suit the facts. He maintained 
that Dunmore‟s agricultural workers were differently situated, because 
the province‟s decision to exclude them from the statutory labour 
relations scheme caused them — unlike their RCMP counterparts in 
Delisle — to be unable to associate freely. That is why Ontario‟s failure 
to include these workers in the scheme violated their right of meaningful 
association and led to a positive obligation on the province to create the 
statutory conditions which would promote their section 2(d) rights. Not 
only did the task at hand require Bastarache J. to wholly distinguish 
agricultural workers from the RCMP, it also forced him to sidestep some 
of Delisle‟s unconditional statements, explain how government inaction 
resulted in violations of the workers‟ freedom to associate, and then to 
show how a positive obligation to promote meaningful associational 
freedom could be imposed on the government.
66
 
Dunmore has its merits and in many ways it is a brave decision. 
Never mind that he had only just endorsed it in Canadian Egg and 
                                                                                                             
64  Libman, supra, note 12. 
65  See Dunmore v. Ontario, [1999] O.J. No. 4947, 37 O.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. Gen. Div.), affd 
[1999] O.J. No. 1104, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 471 (Ont. C.A.), per Sharpe J. (Ont. Gen. Div.), concluding 
that Ontario‟s labour relations legislation was under-inclusiveness in a way that treated agricultural 
workers unequally, but that the claim could not be recognized under the Court‟s equality doctrine. 
The case was so clear, under the Supreme Court‟s ss. 2(d) and 15 precedents, that the Ontario Court 
of Appeal dismissed the workers‟ appeal in a single paragraph which stated, in part (at para. 1), that 
“[w]e did not call on counsel for the respondents because the submissions of counsel for the 
appellants … did not create any doubt in our minds about the correctness of the judgment in appeal.” 
66  For a comment that calls Bastarache J.‟s reasoning to account, see J. Cameron, “The 
„Second Labour Trilogy‟”, supra, note 56, at 80-88. 
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Delisle, Bastarache J. took the monumental step in Dunmore of breaking 
free from the Professional Institute
67
 framework and supplanting it with 
a “single inquiry test” which was based on a conception of associational 
freedom as a collective, rather than an individual, right.
68
 In this, the 
majority opinion began the significant task of moving the Court away 
from the Labour Trilogy, which had all but neutered section 2(d). From 
an outcome-based point of view, there was much for labour advocates to 
applaud. 
And yet, the decision in Dunmore could not stand alongside Delisle 
or other Charter precedent.
69
 In such circumstances, Bastarache J. had to 
distort precedent
70
 and exaggerate the difference between categories of 
workers to reach the conclusion he did. Here, it can be noted that he was 
inconsistent in his approach to the role of evidence in Charter decision-
making. As discussed above, Bastarache J.‟s majority opinions in Harper 
and Bryan discounted and even ignored the evidence because it did not 
satisfy the Thomson Newpspapers requirement of harm. But in Dunmore 
his conclusion depended on fastidious attention to the evidence because 
that was the only way he could plausibly escape the consequences of 
Delisle. It is further indication of the strain Dunmore placed on 
principled decision-making. Whatever the decision‟s merits may be for 
agricultural workers, labour relations and the Charter, or section 2(d) 
more generally, “the reasoning in Dunmore is incoherent”.
71
 
                                                                                                             
67  Justice Bastarache was clearly sensitive about Dunmore‟s relationship to Canadian Egg 
and Delisle and their endorsement of the earlier section 2(d) precedent; he distanced himself from 
his endorsement of doctrine in those cases by stating, in Dunmore, supra, note 5, at para. 14, that the 
Professional Institute framework provided “little assistance” to the Court in the Canadian Egg case, 
and that the Court never ruled on the “validity of the framework” in Delisle, supra, note 5. 
68  Dunmore, id., at para. 16, stating that the purpose of s. 2(d) commands a single inquiry: 
“has the state precluded activity because of its associational nature, thereby discouraging the 
collective pursuit of common goals”? (emphasis in original). 
69  See, e.g., Dunmore (at trial), supra, note 65, at 299 (stating, in reference to Dolphin 
Delivery, that the workers‟ claim “collides directly with a fundamental holding of the Supreme Court 
of Canada … that the Charter has no application to private action”). 
70  For an example of the analytical contortions he used to stay within precedent, see 
Dunmore, supra, note 5, at para. 16 (suggesting that a key passage in Dickson C.J.C.‟s Alberta 
Reference dissent is good law because the passage relied upon “was not explicitly rejected by the 
majority”) and at para. 21 (stating that it can be argued that the reasoning in Delisle does not apply to 
private employers because of a dictum in L‟Heureux-Dubé J.‟s concurrence which “was not rejected 
by the Delisle majority”). 
71  B. Langille, “The Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got Into It and How We Can 
Get Out of It” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 177, at 208 (stating that the Court “attempted to stuff what was 
really a section 15 claim into section 2(d)” and adding that “[t]his particular rabbit cannot come out 
of this particular [section 15] hat, and everyone can see from which hat it actually did emerge [i.e., 
section 2(d)]”). 
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Regardless of its shortcomings, Dunmore has been enormously 
influential. Emboldened by the decision, the Court has since taken the 
extraordinary step of overruling its pre-Dunmore section 2(d) precedent, 
with the notable exception of Delisle v. Canada, which was spared.
72
 As 
a result of B.C. Health Services, the constitutionalization of labour 
relations under section 2(d) of the Charter has begun, and there can be 
little doubt that the momentum for that development sprang from the 
Bastarache opinion in Dunmore.
73
 Ironically, while opening up the scope 
of associational freedom, at the same time Dunmore has had a 
dampening effect on section 2(b). Even though Dunmore addressed the 
exceptional circumstances which warranted the imposition of a positive 
obligation under the Charter — and is limited, in principle, to that setting 
— it has been applied under section 2(b) in place of Irwin Toy‟s minimal 
threshold for breach to restrict the scope of expressive freedom.
74
 Not 
only does Baier v. Alberta
75
 illustrate how unstable the principles of 
Charter decision-making can be, it also shows, regrettably, that as long as 
it can be misconceived and misapplied, precedent is not an obstacle to 
outcome-based Charter interpretation. And that, despite the elaborate 
analysis he provides, is the problem with Justice Bastarache‟s section 
2(b) and 2(d) jurisprudence. 
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE BASTARACHE 
It is neither realistic to expect, nor desirable to seek, complete 
consistency in judicial decision-making. Not only is what consistency 
means and requires open to dispute, too much consistency suggests 
                                                                                                             
72  See Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British 
Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”]. 
See J. Cameron, “Due Process, Collective Bargaining, and s. 2(d) of the Charter: A Comment on 
B.C. Health Services” (2007) 13 C.J.E.L.J. 323; R. Charney, “The Contract Clause Comes to 
Canada: The British Columbia Health Services Case and the Sanctity of Collective Agreements” 
(2007/2008) 23 N.J.C.L. 65. 
73  B.C. Health Services, id. See Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2008] O.J. No. 
4543, 92 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal granted April 2, 2009, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 9 
(S.C.C.) (invalidating Ontario‟s post-Dunmore agricultural workers legislation); and Mounted Police 
Assn. of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] O.J. No. 1352 (Ont. S.C.J.) (finding that 
Parliament‟s exclusion of the RCMP from the regulatory scheme for labour relations in the federal 
public service violates s. 2(d) of the Charter). 
74  Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.). See Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.). Justice 
Bastarache did not join Rothstein J.‟s majority opinion but instead signed LeBel J.‟s concurring 
opinion. 
75  Baier v. Alberta, id. 
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inflexibility and an inability of courts or judges to entertain an organic 
conception of law. Whatever it might mean, consistency was not a 
priority for Justice Bastarache; to the contrary, there is an element and a 
streak of not being accountable in his decision-making. An example not 
discussed in this article is so compelling it should be mentioned just the 
same. It is found in the Court‟s section 7 jurisprudence. 
In Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), Bastarache J. vented 
against Arbour J.‟s admittedly groundbreaking proposal for a substantive 
interpretation of that guarantee.
76
 The issue there was whether section 7‟s 
entitlement clause — the life, liberty and security of the person guarantee 
— could ground a free-standing claim to social or economic benefits, 
falling entirely outside the principles of fundamental justice and the 
administration of justice criterion in the section 7 jurisprudence. Though 
McLachlin C.J.C.‟s majority opinion refused to join issue with Arbour J. 
on that issue, Bastarache J. did not hesitate. Instead, he wrote a fierce 
response to her analysis, which reviewed the authorities and arguments at 
length before declaring, unequivocally and more than once, that “at the 
very least, in order for one to be deprived of a s. 7 right, some 
determinative state action, analogous to a judicial or administrative 
process, must be shown to exist”.
77
 The purpose of his intervention in 
Gosselin was to refute Arbour J.‟s suggestion that section 7 does have a 
role to play in monitoring and enforcing social and economic benefits. 
Given the force of his dissent in Gosselin it is amazing that 
Bastarache J. provided McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. with a key vote in 
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General).
78
 The question there was 
whether legislation which prohibited access to private health insurance, 
for publicly funded services, violated section 7 of the Charter. Justice 
Bastarache joined the joint opinion of McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., 
which found the provision arbitrary and unconstitutional, rather than that 
of Binnie and LeBel JJ. On its face that opinion was more consistent with 
the Bastarache dissent in Gosselin, because it cited the administration of 
                                                                                                             
76  [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.). 
77  Id., at para. 216. Justice Bastarache might have been provoked to respond in Gosselin by 
Arbour J.‟s inventive use of Dunmore v. Ontario, supra, note 5, to support her proposal for a 
substantive interpretation of s. 7 and the imposition of positive obligations on the state to provide 
certain social and economic entitlements. 
78  [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.). The votes among the seven members 
of the panel in Chaoulli were critical because the Court divided 3-3-1; with Deschamps J. basing her 
decision in the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, a majority 
invalidated the provision. The judges who addressed the issue divided evenly under s. 7 of the 
Charter. 
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justice criterion and opposed the use of section 7 to monitor policy 
decisions which were unconnected with the justice system. Even though 
Arbour and Bastarache JJ. dissented in Gosselin and the obligation to 
follow precedent was not an issue in Chaoulli, consistency surely was. In 
the absence of explanation, in the form of concurring reasons, it is 
difficult to resist the conclusion that Justice Bastarache simply changed 
his mind, and did not feel that he was accountable in Chaoulli for the 
position he had so unambiguously taken in Gosselin. 
Michel Bastarache‟s style of decision-making at the Supreme Court 
was certain and authoritative. He was not hesitant to state his 
conclusions, and nor did he equivocate — or doubt — the correctness of 
his decisions, even when he appeared to be changing his mind. It was a 
style that served him well, because he persuaded a majority to sign his 
opinions in the six fundamental freedoms decisions that have been 
discussed in this article. At the same time, his authoritative manner left 
him little room to shift or retreat from the consequences of his own 
precedent. When forced with a choice between what principle suggested 
or even required, and his own perception of what justice demanded in the 
context of particular circumstances, he favoured the outcome at the 
expense of principle and precedent. In doing so he seemed unwilling or 
unable to accept that the circumstances required him to choose between 
the two. 
Principled decision-making does not permit judges to disregard 
precedent, distort the analysis, or change their minds without explanation, 
and nor does it lead — against all hope — to the outcome a judge 
favours. That is the burden and the responsibility of principled decision-
making, and in large part what makes it so challenging. Michel 
Bastarache‟s attachment to principle, and to the rigours of principled 
decision-making are evident, and honourable. But, as the jurisprudence 
shows, he was wilful too, and determined, through force of will and 
implausible lines of analysis, to win a majority for the outcomes he 
preferred. Justice Bastarache was right about judicial accountability and 
yet not fully able, in his fundamental freedoms jurisprudence, to meet its 
standard. 
 
